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Recent Decisions
Bankruptcy - Theory Of Hypothetical Creditor In
Strong Arm Clause Abrogated. Lewis v. Manufacturers
National Bank of Detroit, 364 U.S. 603 (1961). Money
was borrowed and a chattel mortgage given as security.
The chattel mortgage was not recorded until four days
after its execution. The transaction took place in Michigan
where such mortgages were void, even though later recorded, as against creditors of the mortgagor who extended
credit between the execution of a mortgage and its recording. Five months later the borrower filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy and was adjudged a bankrupt. No creditor had extended credit to the bankrupt during the four
days between the execution and recordation of the mortgage. The trustee in bankruptcy claimed that the mortgage
was void as to him by virtue of the "Strong Arm Clause,"
§ 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C.A. (1952)
§ 110 (c). The Referee, sustaining the trustee's contention,
ruled that since the mortgage had not been recorded immediately, a hypothetical creditor could have extended
credit between the execution of the mortgage and its
recordation, and therefore could have acquired a lien at
the date of bankruptcy. Under the "Strong Arm Clause,"
as construed by the controversial case of Constance v.
Harvey, 215 F. 2d 571 (2nd Cir. 1954), the trustee is put
in the position of such a hypothetical creditor and therefore
would prevail over the mortgagee. The District Court overruled the Referee and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the District Court. The Supreme Court, in affirming, held that the mortgage was not void as against
the trustee where no creditor had actually extended credit
between the time of its execution and its recordation.
In reaching its result, the Court overruled the doctrine
of Constance v. Harvey, supra, which purported to clothe
the trustee under the "Strong Arm Clause" with the rights
of a creditor who could have obtained a lien at the date of
bankruptcy whether or not such a creditor actually existed.
Although the effect of the instant case is one -of great
importance in states which have statutes similar to that
of Michigan, it would seem to be minimized in Maryland
because of 2 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 21, §§ 41, 66 which provide that in order for a creditor of a chattel mortgagor
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or a conditional vendee to prevail over the mortgagee or
conditional vendor, the creditor must not merely extend
credit to the mortgagor or conditional vendee, as in Michigan, but must acquire a lien through legal proceedings
before the mortgage or conditional sale contract is recorded.
Creditors Rights - Fi. Fa. Lien On Chattels Extinguished By Return Of Nulla Bona. In Re ContinentalMidway
Corporation, 185 F. Supp. 867 (Md. 1960). Plaintiff got
a judgment in Baltimore City against his debtor on July
19, 1956. On July 26, 1956, a writ of ft. fa. was issued on
the judgment and delivered to the sheriff. A return of
nulla bona was made. On December 13, 1956, an involuntary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the debtor
and the trustee in bankruptcy took possession of and sold
certain chattels of the debtor-bankrupt. Subsequently,
plaintiff filed a petition in the bankruptcy proceedings to
the effect that he was entitled to a priority in payment
because the delivery of the ft. fa. to the sheriff had given
him a lien on those chattels later sold by the trustee.
The Referee determined that plaintiff had not obtained a
lien and therefore was not entitled to a priority. On a
petition to review the Referee's order, the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland, in affirming
the Referee's order, held that, in Maryland, when a writ of
ft fa. is delivered to the sheriff for seizure of a judgment
debtor's personal property it creates merely an inchoate
lien which is extinguished by a return of nulla bona.
In such a case, a new writ must be issued and delivered to
the sheriff. If however, as the Court pointed out, the sheriff
does seize the goods under a ft. fa., the date of the lien relates back to the time the ft. fa. had been delivered to
the sheriff, and the originally inchoate lien becomes consummate.
Although the Court of Appeals has adopted the rule
that normally where a judgment creditor seeks to execute
on personal property of his judgment debtor a lien dates
from the time of delivery of the writ of ft. fa. to the sheriff,
Selby v. Magruder, 6 H. & J. 454 (Md. 1825), our search
reveals no Court of Appeals holding on the instant question.
See Rhynhart, Execution and Fi. Fa. In the People's
Court of Baltimore City, 14 Md. L. Rev. 203 (1954); 2
FREEMAN ON EXECUTIONS

(3rd ed. 1900) § 202.
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Criminal Law - Prosecutor May Not Argue To Jury
His Personal Belief As To Guilt. Greenberg v. United
States, 280 F. 2d 472 (1st Cir. 1960). Defendant was convicted of wilfully attempting to evade payment of income
taxes. During his final argument to the jury, the United
States attorney vigorously expressed his personal opinion
of the trustworthiness of the government's evidence and
the consequent guilt of the accused. In reversing the conviction and remanding the case for a new trial, the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit held that such statements
were improper and prejudicial, stating: "To permit counsel
to express his personal belief in the testimony (even if
not phrased so as to suggest knowledge of additional evidence not known to the jury), would afford him a privilege
not even accorded to witnesses under oath and subject to
cross-examination." (475). The Court noted that since a
certain degree of reliability and credibility attaches to the
opinion or belief of a prosecuting attorney because of his
official position, any statement of his personal belief in a
defendant's guilt would prejudice defendant and therefore
be improper. This strict holding represents a minority
view.
The more prevalent view asks whether the prosecutor's
expressed belief is or is not based solely upon the evidence before the jury, and allows a prosecutor to state his
views as to what the evidence shows as long as there is
nothing to indicate that his belief is based upon circumstances outside of the evidence. Henderson v. United
States, 218 F. 2d 14 (6th Cir. 1955). In Cicero v. State,
200 Md. 614, 92 A. 2d 567 (1952), the Court of Appeals,
following this view, said that since the argument of the
prosecuting attorney was based upon the evidence in the
case, it could not be considered prejudicial. See also Apple
v. State, 190 Md. 661, 59 A. 2d 509 (1948); Riggins v.
State, 125 Md. 165, 93 A. 437 (1915). Cf. Rule 15 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association which reads: "It is improper for a lawyer to assert
in argument his personal belief in his client's innocence or
in the justice of his cause." For further discussion see
Note, The Nature and Consequencesof ForensicMisconduct
in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 Col. L. Rev. 946
(1954); 6 WiGmORE, EVIDENcE (3rd ed. 1940) § 1806. The
cases are collected in 50 A.L.R. 2d 766 (1956).
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Criminal Law - Substitution Of Judges Valid On Defendant's Waiver. Journigan v. State, 223 Md. 405, 164 A.
2d 896 (1960). Defendant was accused of robbery. After
the completion of the first day of his trial, the judge became ill. When he could not continue, the attorney for
defendant, with defendant's consent, agreed to proceed
with a substituted judge. Upon conviction, defendant
appealed, contending that the right to have the same judge
throughout the trial was one that could not be waived.
The Maryland Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction, held that defendant's waiver was valid since there
was no constitutional bar to the consent to the substitution of judges.
It is generally held that one accused of a crime may
waive almost every constitutional right or privilege, including a lawyer, a jury, confrontation of witnesses, and
a speedy trial. Adams v. U. S. Ex Rel. McCann, 317 U.S.
269 (1942); Morland v. United States, 193 F. 2d, 297 (10th
Cir. 1951). However as late as 1915, it was held that a
judge could not lawfully be substituted during the progress of the trial. Freeman v. United States, 227 F. 732 (2d
Cir. 1915). The basis of this holding was later destroyed
in Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276 (1930), where the
Court indicated that the continuous presence of the same
jury was not an imperative requirement, and thus could
be waived. In Simons v. United States, 119 F. 2d 539 (9th
Cir. 1941), cert. den. 314 U.S. 616 (1941), the Court, in
allowing the substitution of a judge during a trial, said
that a criminal defendant may waive the right to have the
same judge throughout the entire trial. Various state
courts have held that an accused can consent to the substitution of one judge for another during a trial. State
v. McCray, 189 Iowa 1239, 179 N.W. 627 (1920); Burrage
v. State, 101 Miss. 598, 58 So. 217 (1912) ; contra, Henderson
v. State, 95 Okla. 342, 246 P. 2d 393 (1952).
For further Maryland cases involving waiver of constitutional rights in criminal proceedings see Midgett v. State,
216 Md. 26, 139 A. 2d 209 (1958); Grammer v. State, 203
Md. 200, 100 A. 2d 257 (1953); Rose v. State, 177 Md. 577,
10 A. 2d 617 (1940).
Domestic Relations - Annulment For Fraudulent Concealment Of Prior Insanity. Holland v. Holland, ...... Md.
...... , 168 A. 2d 380 (1961). Plaintiff sought to annul his
marriage on the ground that his wife and her family
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fraudulently concealed the wife's insanity prior to their
marriage. At the time of the marriage, and for a short
time thereafter, the wife appeared normal, but her premarital schizophrenic paranoid tendencies reoccurred,
causing her to become violent. No children had been horn
of the marriage, and since the reoccurrence of the wife's
insanity the parties had not cohabited. The lower court
sustained the wife's demurrer to the bill of complaint, but
the Court of Appeals held that the demurrer should be
overruled and the case remanded to determine whether the
evidence was sufficient to show fraud going to the essence
of the marriage. The Court said: "We think the sound
view is that concealment of prior insanity may amount to
fraud invalidating a marriage." (382).
The general rule is that fraud which goes to the essence
of the marriage warrants annulment. Anders v. Anders,
224 Mass. 438, 113 N.E. 203 (1916). The majority of jurisdictions take the view that concealment of prior insanity
is not a sufficient ground for annulment, the theory being
that it is merely a misrepresentation as to social status,
temperament, or disposition, and as such, does not go to
the essence of the marriage. Robertson v. Roth, 163 Minn.
501, 204 N.W. 329 (1925). The minority view is that such
concealment may be such fraud as going to the essence of
the marriage, and therefore ground for annulment. Smith
v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371, 184 N.Y.S. 134 (1920). The instant
case adopts the minority view. Maryland has long recognized that the procuring of a marriage by fraud may be
grounds for annulment. Ridgely v. Ridgely, 79 Md. 298, 29
A. 597 (1894); LeBrun v. LeBrun, 55 Md. 496 (1881). The
instant case placed great weight on the language in Brown
v. Scott, 140 Md. 258, 117 A. 114 (1922), to the effect that
where the facts are such that no person of ordinary prudence would have entered such a marriage had he known
the facts, the marriage may -be avoided if the relief is
sought promptly on the discovery of the fraud, and where
no children have been born of the marriage.
For further reference see Strahorn, Void and Voidable
Marriages in Maryland and Their Annulment, 2 Md. L.
Rev. 211 (1938); 3 NELSON, DIVORCE AND AMN

vru'r (2nd

ed. 1945) § 31.36. Cases are collected in 39 A.L.R. 1345
(1925).
Evidence - Lie Detector Results Admissible On Prior
Stipulation. State v. McNamara, ...... la ....... , 104 N.W. 2d
568 (1960). Defendant was convicted of murder in the
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second degree. The Supreme Court of Iowa, in affirming
the conviction, held that where, after negotiations between
defendant's counsel and prosecutor, defendant agreed in
writing to submit to a lie detector test and to allow the
examiner to testify in court as to the results of the test,
the results were admissible against defendant, notwithstanding his objection at the trial.
In the absence of stipulation, the courts uniformly
reject the results of lie detector tests in criminal cases.
People v. Wochnick, 98 Cal. App. 2d 124, 219 P. 2d 70
(1950); State v. Lowry, 163 Kan. 622, 185 P. 2d 147 (1947).
The reasons normally assigned are that testing procedure,
qualification of examiners, and the instrument itself have
not yet become satisfactorily standardized.
Cases involving stipulations as to the use of the results
in evidence, as in the instant case, are meagre. In People
v. Houser, 85 Cal. App. 2d 686, 193 P. 2d 937 (1948), a case
similar to the instant case, the court held that where defendant had agreed in writing that the results could be
admitted into evidence, he could not later object to their
admissibility. However, in LeFevre v. State, 242 Wisc.
416, 8 N.W. 2d 288 (1943), it was held that the findings of
a lie detector test which were favorable to defendant were
properly excluded on objection by the prosecution, the
court failing to discuss the effect of defendant's agreement
to allow the prosecution to use the test results as evidence.
In a concurring opinion in Boeche v. State, 151 Neb. 368,
37 N.W. 2d 593 (1949), it was said that if sufficient foundation were laid to qualify the operator as an expert, and
that defendant willingly submitted to the test, then the
results should be admissible. The majority in the Boeche
case thought that the lie detector had not yet gone beyond
the experimental stage and that there was no error in
excluding the proffered evidence. See Wicker, The Polygraphic Truth Test and The Law of Evidence, 22 Tenn. L.
Rev. 711 (1953); 23 A.L.R. 2d 1306 (1952).
Evidence - Plea Of Guilty To Traffic Offense Admissible In Subsequent Civil Suit. Ando v. Woodberry, et al.,
8 N.Y. 2d 165, 168 N.E. 2d 520 (1960). Since the publication
of the above recent decision in 21 Md. L. Rev. 520 (1961),
there has come to our attention the case of Miller v. Hall,
161 Md. 111, 155 A. 327 (1931), which ruled that a plea of
guilty to a traffic offense was an admission of fault, relevant to the issue of negligence, and therefore admissible
in a subsequent civil suit arising out of the same offense.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXI

Infants - Tort Action Allowed Between Unemancipated
Brothers. Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E. 2d 875
(1960). Plaintiff, age thirteen, by next friend sued his
brother, age seventeen, for injuries received while plaintiff was in a car operated by his brother which struck
another car. The trial court dismissed plaintiff's action on
the ground that an unemancipated infant cannot maintain
an action against his unemancipated infant brother. In
reversing, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia held
that the action by an unemancipated infant against his
unemancipated infant brother for personal injuries should
have been allowed.
In the few jurisdictions where the question has been
directly involved or alluded to, it has been generally
accepted that the fact of relationship by blood or marriage
between the tortfeasor and the injured person, other than
that of parent and, unemancipated child or husband and
wife, does not preclude an action by one against the other.
Cases are collected in, 123 A.L.R. 1020 (1939). Although
the issue has seldom been litigated, a tort action by an
unemancipated infant against his unemancipated infant
brother has been allowed. Herrell v. Haney,.... Tenn ..... 341
S.W. 2d 574 (1960). It is no defense to such an action that
to allow it will encourage fraud and collusion because of
the possible existence of liability insurance, since the interest of the child in freedom from personal injury caused
by the tortious cond'ct of others sufficiently outweighs, any
danger of fraud and collusion. Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal.
2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218, 224 (1955). Nor will the action be
defeated by the assertion that such actions will seriously
disturb the family relationships. Rozell v. Rozell, 281 N.Y.
106, 22 N.E. 2d 254, 255 (1939). The principal case also
refused to accept any of the above-mentioned arguments
against recovery. No Maryland Court of Appeals ruling has
been found on the instant question. See PIossER, ToRTs
(2nd ed. 1955) 677.
Torts - Public Officer Not Liable For Malicious Acts.
Mills v. Smith, ...... Okla ....... 355 P. 2d 1064 (1960). Plaintiff taxpayer brought action against defendant, a county
assessor, alleging that defendant, prompted by wilful and
malicious motives, unjustly increased the valuation of the
plaintiff's property for tax purposes. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, in denying recovery, held that the county
assessor was performing a quasi-judicial duty involving
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discretion, and that so long as he did not exceed the scope
of his authority, he was immune from liability regardless of
his malicious motives.
The near unanimous view of the courts is that a public
officer is not liable for mere negligence in performance of
official duties involving discretion, but that he is liable for
improper performance of ministerial duties which require
no exercise of discretion. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335
(U.S. 1871). Even when the question of malice is specifically in issue, the federal courts and the majority of state
courts have, as in the instant case, denied recovery.
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Matson v. Margiotti,
371 Pa. 188, 88 A. 2d 892 (1952). In a minority of states
liability has been imposed for malicious acts. Hedgepeth
v. Swanson, 223 N.C. 442, 27 S.E. 2d 122 (1943). In many
cases where malice was not involved, the courts have
stated in dictum that public officers exercising discretion
are not liable in the absence of proof of malice. In State,
use of Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A. 2d 137 (1959),
it was held that the superintendent of the Maryland State
Reformatory for Males, in the performance of quasijudicial duties involving the exercise of discretion, was
not liable for injuries inflicted by one of his prisoners upon
another, at least in the absence of malice. Cf. Cocking v.
Wade, 87 Md. 529, 40 A. 104 (1898).
The cases are collected in 2 HAum, AND JA-Es, TORTS
(1956) § 29.10(3); Jennings, Tort Liability of Administrative Officers, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 263 (1937). Both sources
indicate that the trend, if any, is away from immunity for
malicious acts, but this view is based largely on the dictum
in some of the more recent cases. See also PROSSER ON
Toms (2nd ed. 1955) § 109, p. 780.
Torts - Release To Original Tortfeasor Bars Recovery
From Negligent Doctor. Farrarv. Wolfe, ...... Okla .......
357 P. 2d 1005 (1960). Plaintiff nurse sustained injuries in
a fall caused by a slick condition on the floor of the hospital
in which she worked. Subsequently defendant doctor
negligently treated plaintiff for these injuries. Plaintiff
settled her claim against the hospital and gave a general
release to it. Plaintiff later sued defendant, who contended
that the release barred recovery from him. The Supreme
Court of Oklahoma held, one judge dissenting, that the
release barred plaintiff's suit.
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The court adopted the majority view that a release to
the original tortfeasor bars recovery against a doctor who
subsequently treats plaintiff's injury in a negligent manner, thereby aggravating the injury. Sams v. Curfman,
111 Colo. 124, 137 P. 2d 1017 (1943); Edmondson v. Hancock, 40 Ga. App. 587, 151 S.E. 114 (1929). The dissent
adhered to the minority view that a release does not bar
recovery against the negligent doctor unless the plaintiff
and the original tortfeasor so intended. Couillard v.
Charles T. Miller, Inc., 253 Minn. 418, 92 N.W. 2d 96
(1958); Dailey v. Somberg, 28 N.J. 372, 146 A. 2d 676
(1958).
The recent case of Trieschman v. Eaton, 224 Md. 111,
166 A. 2d 892 (1961), somewhat similar to the instant case,
reviewed the majority and minority views, but found it
unnecessary to adopt either, stating that a deferred payment arrangement made by plaintiff and the original tortfeasor did not amount to a release, since it was but a
promise to release if and when all payments were made.
See also Cox v. Md. Elec. Rwys. Co., 126 Md. 300, 95 A.
43 (1915). Cases are collected in 40 A.L.R. 2d 1075 (1955).

